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I. INTRODUCTION
The well-publicized case of Kalief Browder illustrates the devastating effects
of solitary confinement on the many juveniles that are subjected to this treatment
in the United States each year. On the evening of May 15, 2010, sixteen-year old
Kalief and his friend were on their way home from a party when they were arrested
for robbery.1 Unable to post bond, Kalief remained in jail following his arraignment. 2
He was eventually transferred to the Riker’s Island Jail, where he spent over three
years awaiting trial.3 During this time, he turned down several plea offers, and
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2. Id.
3. Id.

YORKER

(Sept.

29,

2014),

690

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

consistently maintained his innocence.4 He was released from prison in 2013 at the
age of twenty, when his case was ultimately dismissed for lack of evidence. 5
Kalif spent approximately two years of his imprisonment in solitary
confinement.6 He attempted suicide several times.7 His attempts continued after
his release, until he was ultimately successful two years later when he hung himself
at his parents’ home.8 In 2016, President Obama announced a ban on solitary
confinement for juveniles in federal prisons, citing Kalief’s suicide, and his “constant
struggle to recover from the trauma of being locked up alone for twenty-three
hours a day.”9
This article addresses the practice of subjecting juveniles to solitary
confinement, and the shattering effects this has on their mental health. It presents
the current state of national and international law on this issue, and argues that
this nation’s current practice of subjecting juveniles to extended periods of isolation
is a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Part I addresses the conditions and the history of the practice of
solitary confinement in the United States. Part II discusses the devastating effects
solitary confinement has on the individuals subjected to this treatment. It presents
the current scientific studies that demonstrate the significant psychological and
physical effects suffered by individuals, with a particular focus on juveniles. Part III
presents the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment cases, and selected federal circuit and district court decisions. Part IV
sets out the arguments why this practice violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. More specifically, it argues that the practice of
subjecting juveniles to extended periods of isolation violates international law,
contradicts current trends in state and federal law, and is contrary to evolving
standards of decency. It also advocates for a different standard of culpability when
applied to juveniles, which would be wholly consistent with the Court’s sentencing
decisions.
II. THE CONDITIONS AND HISTORY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
A. The Conditions
Known as the bing, the hold, the hotbox, SHE (Secure Housing Unit), the block,
the cooler, the pound, and the lockdown, solitary confinement is the physical and
social isolation of an individual within a single cell for twenty-two and one-half to
twenty-four hours per day.10 Any remaining time is generally spent in a barren yard,
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Gonnerman, supra note 1.
8. Benjamin Weiser, Kalief Browder’s Suicide Brought Changes to Rikers. Now It Has Led to a $3
Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/nyregion/kaliefbrowder-settlement-lawsuit.html.
9. Id.
10. Sharon Shalev, Solitary Confinement as a Prison Health Issue, PRISONS & HEALTH 27, 27 (Stefan
Enggist, Lars Møller, Gauden Galea & Caroline Udesen eds., 2014).
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or cage.11 There are two main types of solitary confinement in use today.12 The first,
known as punitive or disciplinary segregation, is employed as punishment for
prisoners who break the rules.13 The second type, referred to as administrative
solitary confinement, is employed when a prisoner is considered a safety risk either
to himself, the staff, or other prisoners.14 While the conditions vary, three factors
are present in all solitary confinement schemes: “social isolation, reduced activity
and environmental input, and loss of autonomy and control over almost all aspects
of daily life.”15 Furthermore, the resources that inmates may receive while in
solitary confinement are at the discretion of the individual facilities and the
officers;16 while some facilities allow inmates the use of books or self-educational
materials, others deny access to such materials altogether.17
B. The History
Pennsylvania was the first state to permit the practice of solitary
confinement.18 The Pennsylvania Eastern State Penitentiary, known as Cherry Hill,
instituted the “silent system” in 1826 where inmates were kept alone in their cells,
and were required to don hoods over their heads during exercise. 19 They were
forbidden to speak.20 This form of confinement was predicated on the idea that
silence would lead to moral reflection which, in turn, would aid in the rehabilitation
of prisoners.21 In 1842, Charles Dickens described his visit to Cherry Hill.

11. Id.
12. Kristen Weir, Alone, in ‘The Hole,’ 43 MONITOR ON PSYCH. 54 (May 2012),
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/05/solitary.
13. Id.
14. Id. For example, under the policy of the State of Michigan, a prisoner may be classified to
administrative segregation for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to:
•
The prisoner demonstrates an inability to be managed with general population privileges.
•
The prisoner is a serious threat to the physical safety of staff or other prisoners or to the good
order of the facility.
•
The prisoner is a serious escape risk.
Michigan prisoners can be held in administrative solitary confinement for any length of time and
are allowed to leave their cells for only one hour per day: they are not allowed calls or visits from friends
or family. Ray Wilbur, Michigan Lags in Solitary Confinement Reform, SPARTAN NEWSROOM (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://news.jrn.msu.edu/2016/12/michigan-lags-behind-in-solitary-confinement-reform. For a more
complete discussion of MDOC policies on this topic see Zachary R. Morgan, Note, Torturing Mentally Ill
and Juvenile Prisoners: An Examination of Michigan’s Administrative Segregation Policies, 94 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 319, 323–25 (2017).
15. Shalev, supra note 10, at 28.
16. Laura Ann Gallagher, Note, More Than a Time Out: Juvenile Solitary Confinement, 18 U.C.
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 244, 248 (2014).
17. Id. at 248.
18. Laura Sullivan, Timeline: Solitary Confinement in US Prisons, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 26, 2006),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5579901
19. Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement is Cruel and Far Too
Unusual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 746 (2015).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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[The prisoner] is led to the cell from which he never again comes forth,
until his whole term of imprisonment has expired. He never hears of
wife and children; home or friends; the life or death of any single
creature. He sees the prison officers, but with that exception he never
looks upon a human countenance, or hears a human voice. He is a man
buried alive; to be dug out in the slow round of years; and in the
meantime dead to everything but torturing anxieties and horrible
despair.22
Other prisons adopted Pennsylvania’s system, however, they were quick to
abandon it amid reports as early as 1830 of prisoners experiencing hallucinations
and dementia.23 It was reported that prisoners kept in solitary “beg with the
greatest earnestness, that they may be hanged out of their misery.”24 Similar
reports followed the initiation of this practice in New York. “This experiment, of
which such favourable results had been anticipated, proved fatal for the majority
of prisoners. It devours the victim incessantly and unmercifully; it does not reform,
it kills. The unfortunate creatures submitted to this experiment wasted away.” 25
The end result was that every state that tried the Pennsylvania model between
1830 and 1880 abandoned it within a few years. 26
The rejection of solitary confinement continued into the latter part of the
twentieth century.27 However, this began to change in the 1970s.28 It was during
this time that the U.S. began to see an explosion in the growth of the prison
population, which has steadily continued to the present.29 The number of
individuals in prisons in the U.S. grew from approximately 300,000 in the 1970s to
almost 1.6 million in 2012, a 400% increase. 30 Unfortunately, funding did not keep
pace with the explosive growth of this population, which resulted in seriously
overcrowded conditions.31 At the same time, there was widespread closing of
mental health hospitals with many of those who were previously treated in
22. Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5, 9 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting CHARLES
DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 148 (John Whitley & Arnold Goldman eds., 1972)).
23. Bennion, supra note 19, at 747
24. Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Psychology and Psychiatry as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 14, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (Nos. 17-1284 & 17-1289) [hereinafter
Brief of Professors].
25. Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
26. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth Amendment Analysis
of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a Mental Illness, 90 DENV. U.L.
REV. 1, 11–12 (2012). “This absolute solitude, if nothing interrupts it, is beyond the strength of man. . . .
It does not reform, it kills.” Ruth Marcus, Why are we Subjecting Our Youths to Solitary Confinement?,
WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-why-are-wesubjecting-our-youths-to-solitary-confinement/2012/10/16/76a7bc50-17b6-11e2-985571f2b202721b_story.html (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville).
27. Hafemeister, supra note 26, at 12.
28. Hafemeister, supra note 26, at 13.
29. Hafemeister, supra note 26, at 13.
30. Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement is Cruel and Far Too
Unusual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 748 (2015).
31. Id. at 747–48.
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hospitals ending up in prisons.32 Penal organizations also abandoned the
commitment to rehabilitation beginning in the 1970s. 33 All of these factors
contributed to a significant increase in the level of violence in prisons, and prison
administrators saw solitary confinement as the solution to these problems. 34 These
same factors also contributed to the rise of supermax facilities. 35 This resulted in
80,000 to 100,000 prisoners being housed in solitary confinement in 2018. 36
Juveniles have not escaped this practice. Because many states try juveniles as
young as fourteen as adults for certain specified crimes, juveniles convicted under
these circumstances are sentenced to adult prisons and treated as adult prisoners.37
Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union report that solitary
confinement of youth is “a serious and widespread problem in the United States.” 38
These groups estimate that more than 95,000 youths were held in prisons and jails
in 2011.39 They also report that a large percentage of these facilities use solitary
confinement for extended periods.40 A 2012 survey from Texas found that the
majority of Texas jails held juveniles in solitary confinement for six months to more
than a year.41 Other surveys indicate that two-thirds of attorneys for indigent
minors report that they had clients who stated that they were placed in solitary
confinement for periods ranging from a few hours up to seven months. 42
32. Id. at 748.
33. Id. at 748–49.
34. Id. at 750.
35. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49
CRIME & DELINQ. 127, 127–30 (2003).
36. Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5 (2018) (mem.) (Sotomayor, J., statement) (citing DEP’T OF
JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2016)).
37. During the 20th century juvenile courts had discretion to waive jurisdiction in certain types
of cases which would cause them to be tried in adult court. See generally Ian M. Kysel, Banishing Solitary:
Litigating an End to the Solitary Confinement of Children in Jails and Prisons, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 675 (2016). Beginning in the 1980s state legislatures enacted laws for the purpose of increasing
the number of children subject to the adult criminal justice system. Id. These practices vary significantly
among states. Id. In some jurisdictions, prosecutors have discretion to waive juveniles to adult courts,
whereas some types of crimes are excluded entirely from juvenile court jurisdiction. Id. A conviction in
adult court generally requires that the children be detained in adult facilities. Id.
38. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION & HUM. RTS. WATCH, GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN: YOUTH IN CONFINEMENT IN
JAILS
AND
PRISONS
ACROSS
THE
UNITED
STATES
2
(2012),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/us1012webwcover.pdf [hereinafter GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN].
39. Id.
40. Id. The American Psychiatric Association also reports that thousands of children are placed in
solitary confinement each year. AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, Solitary Confinement of Juvenile Offenders,
https://www.apa.org/advocacy/criminal-justice/solitary.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). Furthermore,
The American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law reports that twenty-six states prohibit the use of
punitive solitary confinement, fifteen states limit the amount of time spend in punitive confinement (six
hours to ninety days) whereas seven states – Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Texas, and
Wyoming place no limit on or allow indefinite extension of punitive solitary confinement. Andrew B.
Clark, Juvenile Solitary Confinement as a Form of Child Abuse, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 45:350–57, 353
(2017), http://jaapl.org/content/jaapl/45/3/350.full.pdf.
41. Shalev, supra note 10, at 27–35.
42. Mike Ludwig, Despite Reforms, Children in Jails are Still Held in Solitary Confinement,
TRUTHOUT (June 29, 2018), https://truthout.org/articles/despite-reforms-children-in-jails-are-still-heldin-solitary-confinement.
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II. THE EFFECTS OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
A. Outward Manifestations
In 1890, United States Supreme Court Justice Samuel Freeman Miller,
summarizing a hundred years of experience with solitary confinement, stated:
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to
impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others
still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were
not generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient
mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community. 43
More recent studies of solitary confinement have reached similar, and
importantly, uniform conclusions regarding the psychological distress that this
practice produces on the prisoners exposed to it. 44 In an Amicus Curiae brief filed
in the U.S. Supreme Court in connection with Wilkinson v. Austin, the authors
presented the results of a substantial number of studies that were conducted in a
number of prisons over varying periods of time. They note: “The overall consistency
of these findings – the same or similar conclusions reached by different researchers
examining different facilities, in different parts of the world, in different decades,
using different research methods – is striking.”45 The symptoms and problematic
behaviors reported include: “Negative attitudes and affect, insomnia, anxiety,
panic, withdrawal, hypersensitivity to stimuli, ruminations, cognitive dysfunction,
hallucinations, loss of control, irritability, aggression and rage, paranoia,
hopelessness, lethargy, depression, a sense of impending emotional breakdown,
self-mutilation, and suicidal ideation and behavior.”46
Other studies have documented the frequency of these conditions.
Psychopathological effects, which included ruminations, irrational anger,
oversensitivity to stimuli, confused thought process and social withdraws, were
reported by over eighty percent of the inmates exposed to solitary confinement. 47
Additionally, over sixty percent of the inmates reported chronic depression,
emotional flatness, emotional swings, overall deterioration, talking to self, and
violent fantasies.48 Finally, perceptual distortions and hallucinations were
experienced by over forty percent while suicidal thoughts were reported by twentyseven percent of the inmates.49
43. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
44. Brief of Professors, supra note 24, at 14.
45. Brief of Professors, supra note 24, at 34.
46. Brief of Professors, supra note 24, at 34.
47. Haney, supra note 35, at 134.
48. Id.
49. Id. Another group of researchers analyzed data from the medical records of over 240,000
prisoners in the New York City jail system over the three-year period from 2010 to 2013. See generally
Fatos Kaba et al., Solitary Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
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The effect of solitary confinement on juveniles is even more alarming than on
adults. A United States Attorney General task force reported:
Nowhere is the damaging impact of incarceration on vulnerable
children more obvious than when it involves solitary confinement. . . .
[J]uveniles experience symptoms of paranoia, anxiety, and depression
even after very short periods of isolation. Confined youth who spend
extended periods isolated are among the most likely to attempt or
actually commit suicide.50
In its 2012 report, Human Rights Watch spoke with juveniles who
reported the psychological, physical, social and developmental harms
that they suffered both during and following their solitary confinement
experiences.51 They reported the following psychological harms:
experiencing anxiety, rage and insomnia, physically harming
themselves by cutting or other means, thoughts about or attempts at
suicide and struggling with mental disabilities, and past traumas.52 They
also described the following physical harms: lack of adequate physical
exercise along with physical changes and stunted growth resulting from
inadequate nutrition.53 Social and developmental harms resulted from
denial of family contact, denial of education, struggles with intellectual
442 (2014). The objective was to assess the instances of self-harm among the inmates. Id. Self-harm is
defined as “an act performed by individuals on themselves with the potential to result in physical injury,
and potentially fatal self-harm as an act with a high probability of causing significant disability or death.”
Id. These researchers found that while only 7.3% of the prisoners were subjected to solitary
confinement, 53.3% of the acts of self-harm (and 45% of potentially fatal self-harm) were performed by
members of that group. Id. Furthermore, the data demonstrated that inmates assigned to solitary were
2.1 times more likely to self-harm during their time in solitary, but 6.4 times more likely to self-harm
when they were released from solitary. Id. The data also demonstrated that inmates 18 years old and
younger were significantly more likely to engage in self-harm. Id. They concluded that the length of stay
in jail, serious mental illness, solitary confinement, and young age were the significant, and independent,
predictors of self-harm among the prisoners. Id.
50. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR. ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL TASK
FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE 178 (2012).
51. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN: YOUTH IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JAILS
AND PRISONS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 26–36 (2012). Young people describe their experiences in solitary
confinement:
The only thing left to do is go crazy – just sit and talk to the walls. . . . I catch myself [talking
to the walls] every now and again. It’s starting to become a habit because I have nothing
else to do. I can’t read a book. I work out and try to make the best of it. But there is no
best. Sometimes I go crazy and can’t even control my anger anymore. . . . I can’t even get
[out of solitary confinement] early if I do better, so it is frustrating and I just lost it.
Screaming, throwing stuff around. . . . I feel like I am alone, like no one cares about me –
sometimes I feel like, why am I even living.
Id. at 22.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 37–41.
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disabilities and the failure to receive rehabilitation or social
development education and training.54
The effects of solitary confinement on juveniles are compounded by the fact
that 70% of incarcerated youth have been found to have a mental health disorder,
putting them at a high risk of depression, memory loss, psychosis and paranoia. 55
Juveniles in solitary confinement are “nineteen times more likely to commit suicide
than juveniles in the general detained population.”56 Furthermore, once they are
released from prison, juveniles are frequently unable to adjust to society. 57 Studies
show that more than 50% attempt suicide.58
B. Neurobiological Effects of Isolation
There is a consensus among psychological, sociological, neuroscientific, and
anthropological disciplines that social interaction, connection, and belongingness
are “innate and universal survival needs among humans to the same degree as food
and water.”59 Recent social neuroscience research has led scientists to conclude
that the need to belong is a fundamental human need. 60 This is explained by the
fact that the brain is a “social organ”61 in which an “ineradicable bidirectional
relationship” exists between our brains and the social environment. 62 When the
brain is presented with social stimuli, it prompts cerebral processes that form
behavioral responses that contribute to social skills and aid in developing
relationships.63 At the same time, physiological and neurological reactions are
“directly and profoundly shaped by social interactions.”64
Research also demonstrates that social interaction in enriched environments
is a crucial factor in protecting brain health and function. Research on brain
plasticity suggests that positive social encounters produce positive changes to the
neural circuits that underlie cognitive functions, social-affective skills and social

54. Id. at 41–47.
55. Colleen Murphy, The Solitary Confinement of Girls in the United States: International Law and
the Eighth Amendment, 92 TUL. L. REV. 697, 700 (2018).
56. Id.
57. Sanjana Biswas, Solitary Confinement of Juveniles in the Florida Prison System: Analyzing
National and State Issues & Strategies for the Protection of America’s Children, 17 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 1, 4 (2018) (citing AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, Alone & Afraid, Children Held in Solitary
Confinement and Isolation in Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facilities (June 2014)).
58. Id.
59. Federica Coppola, The Brain in Solitude: An (Other) Eighth Amendment Challenge to Solitary
Confinement, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 184, 204 (2019).
60. Roy Baumeister & Mark Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as
a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (1995).
61. Coppola, supra note 59, at 205 (citing DANIEL SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: HOW RELATIONSHIPS
AND THE BRAIN INTERACT TO SHAPE WHO WE ARE 27 (2012)).
62. Coppola, supra note 59, at 206.
63. Id. at 205 (citing Daniel Goleman, Social Intelligence: The New Science of Human
Relationships 4 (2006)).
64. Id. at 206.
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behavior.65 Furthermore, evidence suggests that enriched environments increase
cell proliferation and neurogenesis (the growth of new cells in the brain) especially
in the regions of the brain responsible “for social interaction, memory, and
communication.”66
Research has also documented brain alterations that occur in individuals who
are subjected to social and environmental deprivations, such as those experienced
by individuals in solitary confinement. Professor Stuart Grassian reports that as
little as a few days of solitary confinement will move the EEG pattern toward “an
abnormal pattern characteristic of stupor and delirium,” 67 which results in an
inability to focus and an inability to shift one’s attention.68 Additionally, these brain
alterations can lead to a wide array of adverse psychological effects, which may be
long lasting or even permanent.69 Grassian opines that even the prisoners who did
not become overtly psychiatrically ill during their confinement, are likely to suffer
permanent psychological harm resulting from the confinement.70 This is manifested
by an “intolerance of social interaction” which prevents them from readjusting to
the general prison population and to the general community upon release from
prison.71
Experimental animal research further supports the clinical and other
experimental studies that document the effects of solitary confinement on the
brain. Studies involving rodents reveal that environmental and social deprivation
has negative effects on brain structure and function.72 These studies have shown
that isolated rodents, compared to those housed in enriched environments, exhibit
diminished cortical volume, reduced neuronal connections in the cortical areas and
the hippocampus,73 altered action in the both the reward system and amygdala,

65. Id. (citing Riitta Hari et al., Centrality of Social Interaction in Human Function, 88 NEURON 181
(2015)).
66. Stephanie Cacioppo et al., Toward a Neurology of Loneliness, 140(6) PSYCHOL. BULL. 1464, 1492
(2014).
67. Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 330–
31 (2006).
68. Id. at 331.
69. Coppola, supra note 59, at 203, 220. EEG studies have shown that a few days in isolation can
provoke “brain injury-like waves alterations,” which have been linked with hypersensitivity to stimuli,
“inadequate attention and alertness to the environment” and “a complete breakdown or disintegration
of the identity of the isolated individual.” Coppola, supra note 59, at 208.
70. Grassian, supra note 67, at 332–33.
71. Grassian, supra note 67, at 332–33.
72. Amy Orben et al., The Effects of Social Deprivation on Adolescent Development and Mental
Health, 4 LANCET CHILD ADOLESCENT HEALTH 634, 635–36 (2020). Animal studies employing rodents have
been particularly informative because rats and mice progress through stages of development similar to
humans. Id. The studies focused on the state of development following weaning and into adult maturity.
Id. Like humans, rodents demonstrate a strong attachment to their peers; they actively seek peer
interaction which are considered important social input for healthy social development. Id.
73. Kevin Fone & M. Veronica Porkess, Behavioural and Neurochemical Effects of Post-Weaning
Social Isolation in Rodents—Relevance to Developmental Neuropsychiatric Disorders, 32 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIOR REV. 1087 (2008).
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along with lower myelin production.74 Decreased myelination in the prefrontal
cortex has been observed in a number of psychiatric illnesses, including autism,
anxiety, depression and schizophrenia.75 Additionally, these cerebral changes are
associated with environmental detachment, hostility, aggression and an increased
risk of susceptibility to behaviors that emulate human psychiatric disorders and
diseases, including schizophrenia and neurodegenerative disorders.76 Other
researchers have also observed reduced cerebral cortex development along with
shorter synapses in areas of the brain involved in spatial information processing,
social information, memory and emotion regulation among the rodents housed in
isolation.77
Similar to the case with adults, the long-term consequences of solitary
confinement on juveniles are attributable to the manner in which the juvenile’s
brain reacts to his/her surroundings.78 However, unlike adults, the effect of
isolation on juveniles is exasperated by the fact that adolescence is a crucial period
of development of the human brain.79
Modern neuroscience research, utilizing MRI and fMRIs, has significantly
advanced our knowledge of how the brain develops and matures during
adolescence and into early adulthood.80 The latest research shows that brain
development continues into the early twenties with one author commenting that
twenty-one or twenty-two would be the “biological age of maturity.”81
Developmental neuroscientists studying the adolescent brain have focused
their attention in two areas: (1) brain structure, specifically the age-related changes
in the structure of the brain and the corresponding circuit-based transformations
within the brain; and (2) brain function, or the study of age-related changes in the
manner in which the brain functions.82

74. Coppola, supra note 59, at 208–09 (citing Jia Lie et al., Impaired Adult Myelination in the
Prefrontal Cortex of Socially Isolated Mice, 15 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1621 (2012)).
75. Coppola, supra note 59, at 209–10.
76. Coppola, supra note 59, at 209 (citing Kevin Fone & M. Veronica Porkess, Behavioural and
Neurochemical Effects of Post-weaning Social Isolation in Rodents—Relevance to Developmental
Neuropsychiatric Disorders, 32 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIOR REV. 1087 (2008)).
77. Coppola, supra note 59, at 209 (citing Jelena Dkordjevic et al., Effects of Chronic Social
Isolation on Wistar Rat Behavior and Brain Plasticity Markers, 66 NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 112 (2012)).
78. Biswas, supra note 57, at 4 (citing Tamar R. Birckhead, Children in Isolation: The Solitary
Confinement of Youth, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 47 (2015)). Research shows that brain cells are wired to
react to environmental conditions and can die in extreme settings such as long periods of solitary
confinement. Id. Further, epigenesis, or the process by which the brain cells turn genes on and off in
response to environmental changes also contributes to the long-term effects of isolation. Id. Because
humans are social animals, epigenesis is also caused by deprivation of interaction with the outside world.
Id. Psychologist Craig Haney has referred to the negative effects of solitary confinement on young adults
as the equivalent of placing them in a deep-freeze. Shalev, supra note 10, at 30.
79. Shalev, supra note 10, at 30.
80. See Juvenile Justice Policy, infra note 82, at 584.
81. Adam Ortiz, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Juvenile Death Penalty, Adolescence, Brain
Development and Legal Culpability, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. JUV. JUST. CTR. 2 (Jan. 2004).
82. Kathryn Monahan, Laurence Steinberg & Alex R. Piquero, Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice:
A Developmental Perspective, 44 CRIME & JUST. 577, 582 (2015) [hereinafter Juvenile Justice Policy].
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During adolescence and into early adulthood, four important changes occur
in the brain’s structure which involve the prefrontal cortex, referred to as the
brain’s chief executive officer.
First, during preadolescence and early adolescence, a process known as
synaptic pruning occurs during which unused links between neurons are
eradicated.83 This process serves to increase the efficiency of the brain that allows
for enhanced cognitive abilities and decision making.84 Second, around the onset
of puberty, important changes take place that involve the density and distribution
of dopamine receptors in the paths that connect the limbic system to the prefrontal
cortex.85 The limbic system is the area of the brain where emotions are processed
and which has significant implications for sensation seeking. 86 The third change in
brain structure that occurs during adolescence, and one which continues into the
early twenties, is referred to as myelination, the process by which nerve fibers
become covered in myelin.87 Myelin is the substance that enhances the signal
transmission effectiveness of the brain’s circuits, which within the pre-frontal
cortex is necessary to enable higher-order cognitive functions.88 The fourth
important change that occurs is an increase in the strength of the network of
connections between the prefrontal cortex and other brain regions. 89 This has an
important effect in the regions of the brain responsible for processing emotional
information and regulating self-control.90
Although there is a strong body of research on the development and maturity
of the brain during adolescence, less is known about the effect that the deprivation
of social and environmental stimulation during this time period has on the normal
development of the brain. However, because research has shown that brain cells
are wired to react to environmental conditions and can die in extreme settings such
as long periods of solitary confinement,91 scientists have opined that there is
“[g]ood reason to suspect that harsh conditions such as solitary confinement impair
brain development during [adolescence].” 92 It is important to note that some of the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Juvenile Justice Policy, supra note 82, at 582.
89. Juvenile Justice Policy, supra note 82, at 583.
90. Juvenile Justice Policy, supra note 82, at 583.
91. Sanjana Biswas, Solitary Confinement of Juveniles in the Florida Prison System: Analyzing
National and State Issues & Strategies for the Protection of America’s Children, 17 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 1, 4 (2018) (citing Tamar R. Birckhead, Children in Isolation/ The Solitary Confinement of
Youth, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 47 (2015)).
92. Juvenile Justice Policy, supra note 82, at 606. “In light of the neuroscientific evidence on
developmental immaturity, it is a distinct possibility that punitive settings disrupt adolescent
development in ways that increase the likelihood of subsequent crime. If adolescence is a critical time
for the development of capacities that underlie good adult decision-making, it stands to reason that
experiences that disrupt that development—such as incarceration—should be minimized.” Juvenile
Justice Policy, supra note 82, at 597. Some research suggests that adolescents have a heightened
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most significant developmental changes in the brain during adolescence,
specifically the strength of neuronal connections in the cortical areas and
myelination, are also cerebral changes which have been shown to be the most
detrimentally affected by isolation in animal studies, and which have been linked to
serious psychiatric illnesses such as autism, and schizophrenia.93
While there is limited research on the physiological effect of isolation on
human adolescents, there are numerous studies that have examined this effect on
the behavioral and brain development of adolescent animals.94 Neuroscience
research on adolescent rodents has shown that they are particularly sensitive to
social isolation, which is shown to cause substantial changes in their brains and
corresponding behavior.95 Adolescent rodents, subjected to complete isolation,
experienced widespread functional and structural changes, most commonly in
neuromodulatory, dopamine and serotonin systems within the cortical and striatal
areas of the brain–the areas responsible for motivation and reward processes. 96
Serotonin levels are believed to result in increased anxiety and hyperactivity. 97 The
researchers also reported that these changes did not occur in pre- or postadolescent rodents, but were unique to adolescents.98
Changes in behavior were observed to occur alongside the physiological
changes. Rodents that were subjected to long periods of isolation demonstrated
abnormal behaviors including hyperreactivity to stressful situations and increased
aggression.99 These animals also exhibited diminished performance on tasks that
required learning and attention.100
Another study, this one involving adolescent primates, showed similar effects
to those demonstrated in the rodent studies.101 One researcher reported that
deprivation of social contact in these animals, for as little as one to three weeks,
resulted in “anxiety-like behaviors and a reduction in cell proliferation and
neurogenesis in the hippocampus”—the region of the brain associated with
vulnerability compared to adults under conditions of isolation. For example, one study reported that the
number of adverse experiences in childhood strongly correlated with later suicide attempts and that
adolescents are far more likely to commit suicide than adults in context of the early stressful
experiences. Clark, supra note 40, at 352 (citing Shanta R. Dube et al., Childhood Abuse, Household
Dysfunction, and the Risk of Attempted Suicide Throughout the Life Span: Findings From the Adverse
Childhood Experiences Study, 286 JAMA 3089 (2001). Another study that involved repatriated prisoners
of war from Vietnam, found that the younger an individual was at the time of capture, the less resilience
they had to the conditions of prolonged isolation and torture. Clark, supra note 40, at 352 (citing Crystal
L. Park et al., Does Wartime Captivity Affect Late-Life Mental Health? A Study of Vietnam-era Repatriated
Prisoners of War, 9 RES. HUM. DEV. 191 (2012)).
93. See supra notes 77–81.
94. Amy Orben, Livia Tomova & Sarah-Jayne Blakemoor, The Effects of Social Deprivation on
Adolescent
Development
and
Mental
Health,
4
LANCET
634,
635
(2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanchi/article/PIIS2352-4642(20)30186-3/fulltext.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 636.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Orben, supra note 94, at 636.
100. Orben, supra note 94, at 636.
101. Orben, supra note 94, at 636.
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learning and memory.102 Professors Orben, Tomova and Blakemoor concluded:
“The animal studies reviewed suggest that the consequences of deprivation of
social needs during adolescence can have negative effects resembling features of
human neuropsychiatric disorders and on social cognitive development more
broadly, due to the lack of experiences for social learning.” 103
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. The United States Supreme Court Cases
The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” 104 The
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment consists of two distinct categories of
punishment—sentencing and conditions of confinement.105 With respect to the
conditions of confinement, the Court has stated that “courts have responsibility to
scrutinize claims of cruel and unusual confinement. . . . [W]hen conditions of
confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment, ‘federal courts will
discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.’”106 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the Eighth Amendment to be “a restraint upon the exercise of
legislative power,” which, “imposes some obligation on the judiciary to judge the
constitutionality of punishment.”107 Furthermore, the Court has consistently stated
that what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a fluid, not static concept. 108
One of the earlier cases to interpret the punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment, Weems v. United States, involved an individual who was found guilty
of “falsifying a ‘public and official document,’” and was sentenced to fifteen years
of cadena temporal punishment.109 In holding that the sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment, the Court found that punishment is “cruel in its excess of
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual
in its character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the Bill of Rights,

102. Orben, supra note 94, at 636.
103. Orben, supra note 94, at 637.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
105. See
generally
Cruel
and
Unusual
Punishments,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-8/cruel-and-unusual-punishments (last
visited Apr. 8, 2021).
106. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
405–06 (1974)).
107. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 313–14
(1972) (White, J., concurring)).
108. See e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103 (1976).
109. Weems, 217 U.S. at 357–58. Cadena temporal punishment is punishment in which the
prisoner is kept in chains and made to perform hard labor. Cadena Temporal, ISLAWS.COM,
http://court.islaws.com/cadena-temporal#:~:text=Cadena%20Temporal%20%20What%20is%20Cadena%20temporal%3F%20This,to%20a%20lifetime%20of%20surveillance%20by
%20the%20government (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
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both on account of their degree and kind.”110 “The terms imply something inhuman
and barbarous,—torture and the like.”111 The Court further noted: “The clause of
the Constitution . . . is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”112
The Court further developed the definition of cruel and unusual punishment
in Trop v. Dulles.113 In this case, a soldier who had been found guilty of desertion
was declared by a military court to have lost his United States citizenship. 114 In
finding that the sentence violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment, Justice Warren, writing for the Court, cited Weems v. United
States, and stated: “The Court recognized in that case that the words of the
Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”115 In determining whether the punishment violated
this standard, the Court relied on a United Nations survey of international law and
noted: “[T]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.” 116
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court introduced the concept of deliberate
indifference into its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 117 This case involved a civil
rights action brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas by a prisoner against the state correctional medical director and two
correctional officers.118 The prisoner claimed that he was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment as the result of inadequate medical treatment. 119
The Court noted that the Eighth Amendment, “proscribes more than
physically barbarous punishments,” noting, “[t]he Amendment embodies ‘broad
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.’”120 It
also stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which are,
“incompatible with the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.’”121 The Court found that the, “unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain,” can be caused by the deliberate indifference of prison officials to the
serious medical needs of a prisoner.122 However, it held that “in order to state a
cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omission sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such
110. Weems, 217 U.S. at 377.
111. Id. at 368.
112. Id. at 378.
113. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
114. Id. at 87–88.
115. Id. at 100–01.
116. Id. at 102. J. Warren cited a United Nations’ survey of the nationality laws of 84 countries
which revealed only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey that impose denationalization as a penalty
for desertion. Id. at 103.
117. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
118. Id. at 98.
119. Id. at 101–02.
120. Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
121. Id. (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
122. Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
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indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.”123
Wilson v. Seiter124 marked a significant departure from the Court’s previous
decisions on conditions of confinement cases.125 Rather than focus its attention on
the actual conditions of confinement and the effect these had on the imprisoned,
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, placed the focus on the intent of the prison
officials and, in doing so, added a second required element to these causes of
action.126 In order to be successful on a cruel and unusual punishment, conditions
of confinement action, plaintiffs need to prove subjective intent on the part of
prison officials; in other words, a plaintiff must prove that the individual officials
acted with deliberate indifference to the harmful effect on the prisoners
involved.127
This case was brought by prisoners housed at the Hocking Correctional Facility
in Ohio.128 They complained that the conditions within the facility which included
overcrowding, excessive noise, inadequate heating and cooling, unclean restrooms,
improper ventilation, unsanitary food preparation and dining facilities, and being
required to be housed with mentally ill inmates amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment.129 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, focused on the plain meaning
of the Eighth Amendment, concluding that it only applied to cruel and unusual
“punishment.”130 He reasoned that if, “the pain inflicted is not formally meted out
as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must
be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.”131

123. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court appears to be indicating
that it is the acts or omissions of the prison officials themselves that must be sufficiently harmful, not
the subjective intentions of the officials.
124. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
125. Two cases decided in the intervening period between the Courts rulings in Estelle and
Seiter—Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)—demonstrate
the Court’s continued focus on the actual conditions within the prisons. In Hutto, the Court found that
confinement in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Hutto,
437 U.S. at 686. It stated: “[T]he length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the
confinement meets constitutional standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of ‘gruel’ might be
tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.” Id. at 686–87. The Court rejected
the State’s argument that deference to the decisions of prison administrators was critical to maintaining
secure conditions in prisons, finding instead that a thirty day limit imposed by the district court “presents
little danger of interference with prison administration.” Id. at 688. In Rhodes, the Court again focused
on the physical conditions within the prison, but this time finding that the practice of double ceiling
prisoners did not violate the Eighth Amendment stating: “[T]he Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which house persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of
discomfort. Thus, these considerations properly are weighed by the legislature and prison administration
rather than a court.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349.
126. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 296.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 300.
131. Id.
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Justice White concurring (joined by Justices Marshal, Blackmun and Stevens),
found the deliberate indifference requirement to be inconsistent with the Court’s
previous decisions because it conflicts with prior decisions where the Court, “made
it clear that the conditions are themselves part of the punishment, even though not
specifically ‘meted out’ by a statute or judge.”132 He predicted that the majority’s
intent requirement will prove to be unworkable in future cases, stating:
Inhumane prison conditions often are the result of cumulative actions
and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison,
sometimes over a long period of time. In those circumstances, it is far
from clear whose intent should be examined, and the majority offers
no real guidance on this issue. In truth, intent simply is not very
meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution, such as a
prison system. . . . I fear. . . that ‘serious deprivations of basic human
needs . . . will go unredressed due to an unnecessary and meaningless
search for ‘deliberate indifference.’133
The Court continued to refine the elements of a conditions of confinement
claim in two subsequent cases. In Helling v. McKinney, a prisoner brought a civil
rights action against prison officials alleging that his exposure to environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS) subjected him to an unreasonable risk of harm which
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 134 The
prison officials argued that there was no cognizable action absent proof that the
prisoner was currently suffering from serious medical problems caused by the
exposure to ETS.135 The Court rejected this argument, holding that Eighth
Amendment protections extend to future harm. 136 It held that the plaintiff had
stated a cause of action by alleging that petitioners, “with deliberate indifference,”
exposed him to an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his health. 137
The Court explained that the plaintiff, on remand, will need to prove both the
objective and subjective elements.138 Regarding the objective requirements, the
lower court will need to conduct a scientific and statistical inquiry into the
seriousness of the potential injury and also make a determination that “society
considers the risk . . . to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of
decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner
must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s society
chooses to tolerate.”139
In Farmer v. Brennan, a transsexual prisoner brought suit against prison
officials claiming that the officials showed “deliberate indifference” to his safety by
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 306.
Id. at 310–11.
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 25 (1991).
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id.
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placing him in the general prison population which resulted in his being sexually
and physically attacked by other inmates. 140 The Court adopted the criminal law
“subjective recklessness” standard as the test for deliberate indifference in Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual / conditions of confinement claims.141 The Court
noted that a claimant is not required to show that the official actually believed that
harm would occur, rather the test is whether the official failed to act despite
knowledge that there was a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the inmate. 142 The
Court also opined that “knowledge” can be inferred from the fact that a risk was
obvious.143 It concluded: “We . . . hold that a prison official may be held liable under
the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he
knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk
by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”144
Justice Blackmun, concurring, echoed the arguments set out in Justice White’s
concurring opinion in Wilson. He argued that Wilson’s holding, that prison
conditions are beyond the reach of the Eighth Amendment absent a finding of
subjective culpability on the part of prison officials, is “inconsistent with our
precedents interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”145 He further
argued that Wilson v. Seiter should be overruled stating:
“Punishment” does not necessarily imply a culpable state of mind on
the part of an identifiable punisher. A prisoner may experience
punishment when he suffers “severe, rough, or disastrous treatment” .
. . .146
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was not adopted to protect
prison officials with arguably benign intentions from lawsuits. The
Eighth Amendment guarantees each prisoner that reasonable measure
will be taken to ensure his safety. Where a prisoner can prove that no
such reasonable steps were taken and, as a result, he experienced
severe pain or suffering without any penological justification, the Eighth
Amendment is violated regardless of whether there is an easily
identifiable wrongdoer with poor intentions.147
Recently, three Supreme Court justices have called for the Court to take up
the issue of solitary confinement. Justice Kennedy, concurring in Davis v. Ayala,148
quoted Dostoyevsky stating: “The degree of civilization in a society can be judged

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

511 U.S. 825, 828–31 (1994).
Id. at 839–40.
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 851.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 854.
Id. at 857.
Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257 (2015).

706

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

by entering its prisons.”149 He noted that the discussion in the legal academy and
among policymakers focuses on the adjudication of innocence or guilt and ignores
the questions of what follows.150 As such, “[p]risoners are shut away–out of sight,
out of mind.”151 He called for consideration of the issues presented by solitary
confinement, stating: “In a case that presented the issue, the judiciary may be
required, within its proper jurisdiction and authority, to determine whether
workable alternative systems for long-term confinement exist, and, if so, whether
a correctional system should be required to adopt them.” 152
In Ruiz v. Texas, Justice Breyer dissented from the majority’s denial of an
application for a stay of execution. 153 The petitioner, a death row inmate who had
spent twenty-two years in solitary confinement, argued that his execution violated
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because it
followed “permanent solitary confinement.”154 Justice Breyer argued that this case
properly presented the issue whether “extended solitary confinement [violates] . .
. the Eighth Amendment.”155 Most recently, Justice Sotomayor dissented from the
majority’s denial of a writ of certiorari in Apodaca v. Raemisch, another case
involving solitary confinement.156
B. Lower Federal Court Opinions
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment, conditions-of-confinement
jurisprudence is surrounded by scholarly criticism. Some of the criticism has
centered on the vagueness regarding the types of harm that prisoners must suffer
in order to have a viable cause of action. Some authors have observed that many
courts understand “serious” harm as limited to “physical” harm and require that
the physical harm be the direct result of a deprivation of a specific basic human
need such as “food, water, medical care, shelter or sanitation.” 157
Another scholar has criticized the Supreme Court and lower federal courts for
perpetuating a “narrow application of the conditions of confinement standard”
because by limiting harm to only “physical” harm, they fail to recognize
psychological harm and the severe mental anguish experienced by inmates who
have been subjected to solitary confinement.158
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s deliberate indifference test has been
criticized for its subjective element, which is oftentimes an insurmountable
obstacle in actions challenging objectively harmful conditions of confinement. 159
The difficulty in proving the subjective element is clearly demonstrated in the cases
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 290.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 289–90.
Ruiz v. Texas, 137 S.Ct. 1246 (2017) (Mem.) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1247.
Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S.Ct. 5 (2018) (Mem.).
Coppola, supra note 59, at 190–91.
Coppola, supra note 59, at 186.
Coppola, supra note 59, at 193.
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involving prisoners who suffer from mental illness. In this line of cases, prison
officials, who are not trained in mental health, have been found to not be
deliberately indifferent by claiming they did not have actual knowledge of a
particular need.160
The confusion surrounding the definition of harm, alongside the problematic
deliberate indifference standard, has led to a clear split of authority among the
federal circuit and federal district courts. This conflict is clearly evidenced in the
decisions decided by the Seventh and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In two
recent cases, Isby v. Brown and Giles v. Godinez, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to find solitary confinement to be cruel and unusual
punishment.161 In Isby v. Brown, the plaintiff was held in administrative segregation
(SHU) for a period in excess of ten years. 162 He was confined to an eighty square
foot cell, twenty-three hours per day.163 He was limited to one hour per day of
exercise in a yard, which was frequently covered in bird feces with dead birds and
where he was required to wear a “nylon dog leash.”164 He also complained that the
lights remained on twenty-four hours a day, he had limited communication with
other prisoners or staff, the water in showers was either scalding hot or freezing
cold, and temperatures in his cell caused him to freeze in the winter and burn up in
the summer.165 Although the court expressed some concern regarding the length
of the confinement in the SHU, it found that the conditions did not “rise to the level
of extreme deprivation of basic human needs required to satisfy Eighth Amendment
standards[,]”166 which the court defined as an “identifiable human need such as
food, warmth, or exercise.”167
In Giles, a prisoner had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder whose
symptoms included depression, suicidal thoughts, anxiety, and auditory
hallucinations.168 He had attempted suicide three times.169 He alleged that being
subjected to solitary confinement was cruel and unusual punishment due to the
combined effect that segregation and the conditions within segregation had on his
mental illness.170 The court refused to find that the conditions created an
“objectively serious condition [that created] an excessive risk to his health and
safety.”171 It also refused to consider psychological harm as a cognizable harm. 172

160. Coppola, supra note 59, at 189. See e.g., Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir.
2019).
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 522 (7th Cir. 2017); Giles, 914 F.3d at 1049.
Isby, 856 F.3d at 512.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 514–15.
Id. at 522.
Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)).
Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1051–52.
Id. at 1052.
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The Seventh Circuit Court’s decisions stand in stark contrast with that of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In its 2019 decision in Porter v. Clarke, a case with
strikingly similar facts to the Seventh Circuit’s Isby case, the Fourth Circuit held that
long term detention in solitary confinement created a substantial risk of
psychological and emotional harm and that defendant prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to the risk.173
This case was bought by several death row inmates housed in the Sussex I
State Prison in Virginia alleging that their conditions of confinement amounted to
cruel and unusual punishment.174 The inmates were confined to cells that were
seventy-one square feet for approximately twenty-three hours per day and which
were lit twenty-four hours a day.175 During the outdoor time, (one hour five times
a week) they were confined to a steel and wire mesh enclosed space that measured
7.9 by 20 feet long (“approximately the size of a parking space”). 176 The inmates
could keep a television and had access to publications and library materials.177 They
were also allowed noncontact visitation on weekends and holidays.178
The court held that cognizable harm could encompass psychological harm
stating: “To be ‘sufficiently serious,’ the deprivation must be ‘extreme’ – meaning
that it poses a ‘serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the
challenged conditions,’ or ‘a substantial risk of serious harm resulting from . . .
exposure to the challenged conditions.’”179 It discussed numerous studies that
demonstrate the psychological injury resulting from solitary confinement. 180 More
importantly, it distinguished its previous decisions which held to the contrary.181 In
doing so, it noted that its 1975 decision predated all of the Supreme Court’s
conditions of confinement cases,182 while another case predated much of the
research that demonstrates the harmful effects of solitary confinement. 183 Finally
with respect to the deliberate indifference element, the court found that the
“extensive scholarly literature describing and quantifying the adverse mental health
effects of prolonged solitary confinement that has emerged in recent years
provides circumstantial evidence that the risk of such harm ‘was so obvious that it
had to have been known.’”184
173. Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 361 (4th Cir. 2019).
174. Id. at 353.
175. Id. at 353–54.
176. Id. at 353.
177. Id. at 354.
178. Id.
179. Porter, 923 F.3d at 358 (quoting Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016)).
180. Id. at 356.
181. Id. at 358–59.
182. Id. at 358.
183. Id. at 358–59.
184. Id. at 361 (quoting Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 136 (4th Cir. 2015)). Some recent
decisions from federal district courts have also recognized cognizable harm resulting from solitary
confinement. See Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 778 (M.D. Penn. 2016) (finding that inmate’s
placement in solitary confinement for 36 years resulted in psychological deterioration and unreasonably
jeopardized his mental health, which is a “proper subject of constitutional scrutiny”). See also People v.
Annucci, 180 F. Supp. 3d 294, 297, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (upholding a class action settlement) (The court
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C. Federal Cases Involving Juveniles
Civil rights litigation has had some impact on the use of solitary confinement.
Cases in New York, Mississippi, Ohio, and Illinois have resulted in settlements or
judgments limiting the use of this practice on juveniles. 185 However, constitutional
challenges have had less success.186 Although the Supreme Court has recently found
violations of the Eighth Amendment with respect to juvenile sentencing, 187 it has
not decided an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement case involving
juveniles. Furthermore, the split evidenced among the federal circuit courts
regarding the adult cases is also demonstrated in federal district court decisions
involving juveniles.
Two federal district courts in New York recently granted preliminary
injunctions against prison officials in cases brought by juveniles who were subjected
to solitary confinement. In V.W. v. Conway,188 the court noted “a broad consensus
among the scientific and professional community that juveniles are psychologically
more vulnerable than adults.”189 It also noted the Supreme Court “has continued to
stress that these fundamental differences are consequential in the Eighth
Amendment context.”190 With respect to the subjective deliberate indifference
element, the court found the defendants were aware of the risks associated with
this type of confinement. 191 Finally, the court noted that extensive evidence exists
which demonstrates that the use of isolation on juveniles is not reasonably related
to prison safety.192
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of New York reached a
similar decision in A.T. v. Harder,193 a case brought by groups of sixteen and
seventeen-year-old inmates alleging Eighth Amendment violations based upon the

noted that the settlement “should end the use and conditions of solitary confinement in New York as
they have existed for decades.” It further remarked: “This litigation, and the way it has been handled by
all of the attorneys, is the best example of the power of impact litigation to redress conditions that affect
the most vulnerable members of our society.”).
185. Amy Fettig, The Movement to Stop Youth Solitary Confinement: Drivers of Success &
Remaining Challenges, 62 S.D. L. REV. 776, 787–89 (2017). See also Abigail Q. Cooper, Beyond the Reach
of the Constitution: A New Approach to Juvenile Solitary Confinement Reform, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 343, 355–57 (2017).
186. See generally Ian M. Kysel, Banishing Solitary Confinement: Litigating an End to the Solitary
Confinement of Children in Jails and Prisons, 40 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 675 (2016).
187. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding it unconstitutional to impose the death
penalty for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)
(holding that juveniles may not be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide
offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that mandatory life sentences without parole
are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders).
188. V.W. v. Conway, 236 F. Supp.3d 554 (N.D.N.Y. 2017).
189. Id. at 583.
190. Id. (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Graham, 560
U.S. at 82).
191. Id. at 584.
192. Id.
193. A.T. v. Harder, 298 F. Supp. 3d 391 (N.D.N.Y. 2018).
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routine practice of placing juveniles in solitary confinement. 194 However, the
Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Hughes v. Judd195 rejected
the juvenile plaintiffs’ claim that subjecting them to isolation was an Eighth
Amendment violation.196 It rejected their arguments that the constitutional
standard governing juveniles should be more demanding than that pertaining to
adults.197 In doing so, the court rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on Roper, Graham, and
Miller on the grounds that these cases involved sentencing, not conditions of
confinement.198 The court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that psychological
injury is cognizable under the Eighth Amendment, opining that injury requires
deprivation of a single human need such as food, warmth, or exercise. 199
IV. THE ARGUMENTS
The Supreme Court’s current test for Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Conditions of Confinement challenges consists of two prongs: (1) an objective prong
which involves an analysis of the conditions and the risk of harm to the individual
and (2) a subjective prong which requires a finding that the prison officials’ actions
(or inaction) were undertaken with deliberate indifference to the risk of harm to
the prisoner.200
A. The Objective Element
The substantial body of research which has been conducted in recent years
clearly establishes that subjecting individuals, particularly juveniles, to solitary
confinement undoubtedly exposes them to a “substantial risk of serious harm.”201
Studies also demonstrate that solitary confinement is a physically barbarous form
of punishment because prisoners subjected to it experience marked changes in
both their brain structure and function–changes which have been associated with
chronic conditions of psychosis.202 Further, solitary confinement causes
“unnecessary and wonton infliction of pain,”203 in that inmates subjected to these
conditions experience extreme emotional and psychological distress.204 The degree
of severity is made clear by the staggering numbers of suicide attempts within this
particular population.205
194. Id. at 400.
195. Hughes v. Judd, 108 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
196. Id. at 1258.
197. Id. at 1174.
198. Id. at 1181–82.
199. Id. at 1242.
200. See supra notes 134–44.
201. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). See also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35
(1993) (a conditions of confinement case in which the Court held that exposing inmates to
environmental tobacco smoke could constitute cruel and unusual punishment because it presents an
“unreasonable risk of serious harm”).
202. See discussion supra notes 72–77.
203. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
204. See discussion supra notes 43–58.
205. See supra note 40.
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the lower federal courts that have
aligned with it are wrong in refusing to recognize prisoners’ Eighth Amendment
claims in the absence of proof of deprivations of “basic human needs”206 in the form
of “food, water, medical care, shelter or sanitation.”207 Their reasoning ignores the
vast body of contemporary research that has shown that socialization and
environmental stimulation are basic human needs.208 Furthermore, this substantial
body of research also demonstrates that the serious effects isolation produces are
not only psychological but physical, in that it often results in permanent
neurobiological changes in those subjected to it.209
B. Evolving Standards of Decency
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man.”210 When addressing conditions of confinement claims under the
Eighth Amendment, the Court has stated that “prisoners retain the essence of
human dignity inherent in all persons.”211 Furthermore, the Court has held that
conditions of confinement will amount to cruel and unusual punishment when the
conditions fail to comport with “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”212
Advocates for abolishing solitary confinement argue that evolving standards
of decency, as evidenced by international law, federal administrative law, federal
agency opinions, and the opinions of professional organizations, along with the
current trends in case law and state legislation, support the conclusion that this
practice violates these standards of decency.213 As Justice Kennedy has recently
remarked: “The human toll wrought by extended terms of isolation long has been
understood, and questioned . . . . There are indications of a new and growing
awareness in the broader public of the subject of corrections and of solitary
confinement in particular. . . . [C]onsideration of these issues is needed.”214

206. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 522 (7th Cir. 2017).
207. See Coppola, supra note 59, at 190–91.
208. See discussion supra notes 59–64.
209. See discussion supra notes 59–103.
210. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
211. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011).
212. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
213. See, e.g., Kysel, supra note 37; Alexander A. Reinert, Solitary Troubles, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 927 (2018); Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Conditions
of Confinement, 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 373 (1995).
214. Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 287–89 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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i. International Law
The United States Supreme Court has long relied on foreign law,215 although
the doctrinal areas in which the Court has cited foreign law has shifted over time. 216
While the Court’s early focus was on economic liberties, since 1972, the cases in
which it has cited to foreign law have focused on freedom of speech, the right to
privacy, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.217
The Court has most frequently cited international law when resolving
questions involving the Eighth Amendment, 218 because since the beginning of the
modern Cruel and Unusual Punishment Doctrine, the Court has recognized that
international opinion, regarding the acceptability of particular forms of
punishment, has been an important part of the analysis.219 An early example of this
is the Eighth Amendment case, Trop v. Dulles, where the Court noted that “civilized
nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed
as punishment for crime.”220 The Trop Court further noted that it has “recognized
the relevance of the views of the international community” in determining if a
particular punishment comports with contemporary understandings of the Eighth
Amendment.221
Three decisions issued in the early 2000s, Atkins v. Virginia,222 Lawrence v.
Texas,223 and Roper v. Simmons,224 raised the issue of reliance on foreign law to a
new level of prominence. In each of these cases, the Court relied on foreign law as
support for overturning prior precedents and, in reaching a decision that conflicted
with the challenged legislation, cited changes in societal morals and values.225 The
Court continued this practice in its 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, in which it
215. Steven A. Simon, The Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Rights Cases:
An Empirical Study, 1 J.L. & CTS. 279, 286–90 (2013). The first citation appeared in 1843, in an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Taney. Id. at 287.
216. Id.
217. Id. One author characterized the role of foreign law in the Court’s opinions as falling into
categories, the largest being consensus confirmation and consensus identification. Id. at 288–90.
Consensus confirmation occurs in cases where the Court has used foreign law to “confirm or buttress
the existence of consensus on a rule on which consensus already was clear in the United States and that
was not at odds with the governmental acts challenged in the case.” Id. at 288. Consensus identification,
on the other hand, involves cases where the “Court has referenced foreign law to support the application
of a rule for which there was not already an American consensus on the rule.” Simon, supra note 215, at
290.
218. Rex D. Glensy, The Use of International Law in U.S. Constitutional Adjudication, 25 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 197, 237 (2011).
219. Id.
220. Simon, supra note 215, at 290 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
221. Thompson v. Oklahoma 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 102); Glensy,
supra note 218.
222. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding the execution of mentally retarded
individuals violated the Eighth Amendment).
223. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional criminal laws prohibiting
sexual acts between same sex persons).
224. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the execution of persons under the
age of eighteen violated the Eighth Amendment).
225. Simon, supra note 215 at 293–94.
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held that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits
sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide
crimes.226
International law relating to the treatment of prisoners began to be
developed at the end of World War II, beginning with the Charter of the United
Nations which went into force in 1945. 227 Article 55 of the Charter endorses
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”228 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, notes in Article 5 “no one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of
punishment.”229 Scholars have argued that the Declaration has become binding as
a matter of customary international law.230
In December 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, also known as the
Nelson Mandela Rules.231 These rules define solitary confinement as “confinement
of prisoners for 22 hours or more a day without meaningful human contact.” 232
They expressly prohibit indefinite solitary confinement and prolonged solitary
confinement, defined as “confinement for a time period in excess of 15 consecutive
days.”233 The Rules further state that “The prohibition of the use of solitary
confinement and similar measures in cases involving women and children, as
referred to in other United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and
criminal justice . . . continues to apply.”234
With respect to juveniles, the U.N.’s Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which has been ratified by every country member of the United Nations except for
the United States, compels a state to incarcerate a child “only as a measure of last
resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.” 235 Additionally, the U.N.
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the group with responsibility for interpreting
the Convention, has opined that punitive solitary confinement of juveniles is cruel,

226. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
227. UN Charter, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html
(last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
228. U.N. Charter art. 55, ¶ 4. For a discussion of International Law regarding solitary
confinement, see Nan. D. Miller, International Protection of the Rights of Prisoners: Is Solitary
Confinement in the United States a Violation of International Standards?, 26 CAL. WEST. INT’L. L. J. 139
(1995). See also GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN, supra note 38, at 70–76.
229. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 5, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
230. See. e.g., Suzanne M. Bernard, An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of International Law
on the Humane Treatment of Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 759, 769 (1994).
231. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment
of
Prisoners
(the
Nelson
Mandela
Rules)
(Dec.
17,
2015),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/GA-RESOLUTION/E_ebook.pdf.
232. Id. at 14.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 37(b), Convention on Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989).
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inhuman or degrading treatment. 236 Furthermore, the United Nations Guidelines
for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) pronounces solitary
confinement of adolescents as cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 237 This
position was reasserted by the special rapporteur on torture in his report to General
Assembly in 2011: “The Special Rapporteur holds the view that the imposition of
solitary confinement, of any duration, on juveniles is cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment and violated article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and article 16 of the Convention against Torture.”238
ii. The Maturing Consensus in National and State Law and Policy
In January 2016, President Obama issued an Executive Order banning the use
of punitive solitary confinement on juveniles in federal prisons.239 In doing so, he
followed the Department of Justice’s recommendations set out in its Report and
Recommendations Concerning the Use of Restrictive Housing (“the Report”).240 The
Report recommended that juveniles should not be subjected to isolation except as
“a temporary measure in response to an act of serious violence.” 241 The Report

236. G.A. Res. 45/113, ¶ 4(L), United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
Their
Liberty
(Dec.
14,
1990),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/JuvenilesDeprivedOfLiberty.aspx. GROWING UP
LOCKED DOWN, supra note 38, at 74.
237. GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN, supra note 38, at 74.
238. Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, 21 (Aug. 5, 2011),
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/445/70/PDF/N1144570.pdf?OpenElement.
The special rapporteur called for an absolute ban on solitary confinement of juveniles and an absolute
ban on solitary confinement of individuals with mental disabilities. Id. Another important source of
international law, the European Convention on Human Rights and its enforcement arm, the European
Court of Human Rights also support the conclusion that the current practice of solitary confinement is
incompatible with “evolving standards of decency” of civilized societies. European Convention on
Human Rights, art. 3, Sept. 21, 1970. Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits
torture and "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. Although the Court has not decided
a case involving the solitary confinement of juveniles, it has reached decisions in two cases involving
adults. In Soering v. United Kingdom, the Court found a violation of Article 3’s prohibition against
“inhuman or degrading treatment” based on what it termed the “death row phenomenon” – the “everpresent and mounting anguish of awaiting execution” alongside the “increasing tension and
psychological trauma” caused by solitary confinement conditions. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). The Court also found an Article 3 violation in Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and
Russia where a prisoner was detailed in strict isolation for eight years during which time, he was kept in
an unheated cell, deprived food as a form of punishment, and allowed to shower only rarely.
Additionally, he was not allowed any contact with other prisoners, forbidden to contact his attorney,
denied regular visits from his family, and unable to send or receive mail. Ilascu and Others v. Moldova
and Russia, 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (July 8, 2004).
239. Press Release, The White House, FACT SHEET: Department of Justice Review of Solitary
Confinement,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/25/fact-sheetdepartment-justice-review-solitary-confinement.
240. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING,
[hereinafter
“Report”]
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/report-and-recommendationsconcerning-use-restrictive-housing.
241. Id. at 114.
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further recommended that isolation should only be used with the consent of a
mental health professional.242
Many states have recently passed laws that limit the use of solitary
confinement of juveniles. Twenty-nine states currently prohibit punitive solitary
confinement, while fifteen states limit the time an adolescent may spend in punitive
confinement.243 Other states have passed more comprehensive restrictions on this
practice including Colorado, California, and New Jersey.244 Additionally, numerous
professional groups have also called for an end to this practice, particularly with
respect to juveniles. The American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
issued a 2012 policy statement opposing the solitary confinement of juveniles. 245
In 2017, the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section called on legislative
bodies and governmental agencies to end solitary confinement of adolescents
except in cases of immediate harm.246 In 2018, the Association of State Correctional
Administrators called for the reduced use and reform of the system of
administrative segregation.247
All of the above demonstrates that the practice of subjecting juveniles to
prolonged periods of solitary confinement meets the objective element of a Cruel
and Unusual Punishment – Conditions of Confinement claim because the practice
poses a substantial risk of harm to them and the practice fails to comport with
evolving standards of decency.
B. The Deliberate Indifference Element
The subjective element of an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment—conditions of confinement claim requires a showing that prison
officials acted with deliberate indifference to the harmful effects of the conditions
on the prisoners involved. This requirement has been criticized as being
inconsistent with the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by two justices:
Justice White, concurring in Wilson v. Seiter,248 and more recently Justice Blackmun,
242. Id. In 2018, the Association of State Correctional Administrators called for the reduced use
and reform of the system of administrative segregation. Resnik et. al, Reforming Restrictive Housing: The
2018 ASCA-Liman Nationwide Survey of Time-in-Cell, YALE L. SCH. (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3264350.
243. Andrew B. Clark, Juvenile Solitary Confinement as a Form of Child Abuse, 45 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 350, 351 (2017).
244. Amy Fettig, The Movement to Stop Youth Solitary Confinement: Drivers of Success &
Remaining Challenges, 62 S.D. L. REV. 776, 786–87 (2017); Brenda Flanagan, NJ Law Limits Use of Solitary
Confinement
for
Juveniles,
NJ
SPOTLIGHT
NEWS
(Jan.
29,
2016),
https://www.njtvonline.org/news/video/nj-law-limits-use-of-solitary-confinement-for-juveniles.
245. Clark, supra note 243, at 350–51.
246. ABA against the use of solitary confinement of juveniles, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2017/08/aba_against_the_use0/.
247. Judith Resnik et al., Reforming Restrictive Housing: The 2018 ASCA-Liman Nationwide
Survey of Time-in-Cell, SSRN: YALE L. SCH., PUB. L. RES. PAPER NO. 656 at 1, 82 (Oct. 18, 2018), [hereinafter
Reforming
Restrictive
Housing],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3264350#references-widget.
248. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 306 (1991) (White, J., concurring).
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concurring in Farmer v. Brennan249 in which he opined: “The Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause was not adopted to protect prison officials with arguably
benign intentions from lawsuits.”250
Justices White and Blackmun are correct. While requiring a showing that
prison officials acted intentionally in causing harm may be a rational requirement
in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions where the officials can be held personally liable for their
actions, it is not rational in cases where institutional collective decision-making
results in dangerous and unsafe conditions that affect the health and safety of
prisoners and where prisoners are seeking only injunctive relief. Furthermore, to
require proof of an official’s subjective intent, while at the same time affording
deference to the same prison official’s decisions, creates a double layer of
protection for the offending officials, at the expense of vulnerable, incarcerated
prisoners, particularly youths.
There appears to be some recent indication that the Court is relaxing the
deliberate indifference requirement as originally set out by Justice Scalia in
Seiter.251 There also appears to be some indication that the Court may be moving
away from it entirely. One indication that the Court may be loosening the intent
requirement is seen in the Farmer opinion, where the Court opined that knowledge
of the potential risk of harm to prisoners on the part of prison officials can be
inferred from the fact that the risk was obvious, rather than requiring evidence of
the offending officer’s subjective knowledge of the risk of harm. 252 Further evidence
of a movement away from a strict application of this test is also seen in Brown v.
Plata.253 In this case, the Court upheld the lower court’s decision, which found that
serious overcrowding resulted in violations of prisoners’ Eighth Amendment’s rights
to safe conditions and which ordered that certain numbers of prisoners be released
to alleviate the overcrowding.254 In affirming the lower court’s ruling, the Court did
not address the deliberate indifference requirement. 255 The Court’s unwillingness
to discuss this element has led some scholars to believe that the Court has opened
the door to overlooking this requirement in a wider array of situations.256
Even though it appears that the Court may be moving away from the
deliberate indifference element as originally set out by Justice Scalia, there should
be little doubt that this element is met in cases where prison officials have
subjected prisoners, particularly juveniles, to prolonged solitary confinement. The
substantial risk of harm from this treatment is obvious and is demonstrated in the
substantial body of scholarly literature which has recently been published on this
subject.257 Furthermore, this body of literature has clearly informed not only the
249. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 851–52 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 857.
251. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 297. See supra notes 120–126 and accompanying text.
252. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
253. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 924–26 (2011).
254. Id. at 502.
255. See generally id.
256. Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Through the Lens of Childhood and Adolescence, 15 PA. L.: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 286, 310 (2012).
257. See supra notes 76–106.
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general public, but should also be known to prison officials. As the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals pronounced in a recent 2019 decision, these studies provide
evidence that the risk of harm is ‘so obvious that it had to have been known” to the
officials.258 Finally, the fact that the substantial risk of harm to prisoners resulting
from this treatment is well known to prison administrators is also evidenced by the
2018 statement of the Association of State Correctional Administrators which called
for the reduced use and reform of the system of administrative segregation. 259
Even though the above arguments establish that the deliberate indifference
element can be met in cases involving juveniles, a different standard of culpability
is required in these cases. The Supreme Court’s relatively recent recognition in
Roper, Graham, and Miller that juveniles are different from adults, which has
informed its decisions regarding the constitutional rights of juveniles in its Eighth
Amendment sentencing cases, should also inform juvenile conditions of
confinement cases.260
The foundational legal principles that have traditionally applied to children,
which are premised on the assumption that children lack the capacity to care for
themselves, should apply to imprisoned adolescents. 261 As a result, the States’
parens patriae power, which is premised on these assumptions, applies to
imprisoned juveniles who are under state control. In fact, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the “State has a parens patriae interest in preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child” when they were detained in a juvenile justice
system.262 Nothing less should apply to juveniles in adult prisons. Accordingly,
prison officials are required to consider the best interests of the child in these
situations. Thus, this heightened burden, standing alone, prohibits the imposition
of solitary confinement of adolescents in all but the most extreme situations and
for the shortest period of time.263
Moreover, different standards of culpability should apply in cases involving
juvenile prisoners based on the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence in which it
recognized that juveniles are categorically different from adults. Its recognition
that juveniles are categorically less mature in their decision-making capacity and
highly vulnerable to outside pressures, supports a conclusion that adult correctional
standards should not be applied to juvenile inmates. One scholar has opined that
the Court’s acknowledgement in Roper and Graham that the Constitution should
afford protections to youths which are not required for adults seems to suggest a
258. Porter, 923 F.3d at 361.
259. See generally Reforming Restrictive Housing, supra note 247.
260. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Additionally, in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, the Court acknowledged that children “characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature
judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them.” J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 267–272 (2011).
261. See Kim Brooks Tandy, Do No Harm: The Enhanced Application of Legal and Professional
Standards in Protecting Youth from the Harm of Isolation in Youth Correctional Facilities, 34 CHILD. LEGAL
RTS. J. 143, 161 (2014).
262. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
263. Id.
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movement towards a jurisprudence that relies on a developmental approach to
issues involving juvenile law.264
Other scholars have opined that developmental considerations should be
taken into account in these cases, which will yield a more demanding constitutional
standard governing juveniles as compared to adults.265 One author commented that
the Court’s recent jurisprudence recognizing the developmental differences
between children and adults should mean that the Eighth Amendment “imposes an
obligation on prison officials to preserve and promote the welfare of child prisoners
- as a requirement rooted in their basic humanity and dignity.”266 Others have also
advocated for a similar approach:
The standard for conditions cases applied to juveniles should be
appropriately tailored to their developmental status, and not simply a
reiteration of adult standards. To incorporate developmental status
into the existing structure for conditions claim, a juvenile deliberate
indifference standard would require courts to consider: (1) the
seriousness of the harm in light of juvenile vulnerability; and (2) the
intent of the correctional official in light of the heightened duty to
protect juveniles.267
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the goals of the penal system
are: “to punish justly, to deter future crime, and to return imprisoned persons to
society with an improved change of being useful, law-abiding citizens.”268 None of
these penological goals are met by subjecting incarcerated juveniles to the brutal
conditions of solitary confinement. It is time that the Supreme Court takes up the
issue of solitary confinement, examines it in light of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Sotomayor have called upon the Court to do, and find that the practice is
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Tandy, supra note 261, at 286.
Kysel, supra note 37, at 700.
Kysel, supra note 37, at 700.
Levick et al., supra note 256, at 312.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981).

